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ABSTRACT
In 2004, the White House and then Congress 
determined there should be  an “Information 
Sharing Environment”  that facilitates the  flow of 
critical information for counterterrorism, related 
law enforcement, and disaster management 
activities. That work has been progressing but a 
major challenge  is how to create technologies 
that: ensure  compliance  with laws and policies of 
the  federal government, fifty states, and 
individual agencies; convey appropriate  data 
that would support access control and privilege 
decisions  in different jurisdictions; and achieve 
accountability and transparency for this  activity. 
We  have  built a prototype  of Fusion Center 
information sharing that shows significant 
progress in the  representation of law in a policy 
language, the  reasoning of that law over data 
transactions occurring in a web environment 
(internet or intranet), acquiring necessary 
information from authoritative  sources wherever 
they reside in the  decentralized environment, and 
providing both a binary response  suitable  for 
automated workflow implementation and a 
detailed justification suitable  for human 
validation of the  conclusion. In this  paper, we 
briefly describe  the  technologies employed for 
serializing the  data and policy, reasoning over 
the  rules contained in the policy, and displaying 
the  results to users. These combine  to provide  a 
powerful tool supporting a range  of necessary 
governmental functions including access control, 
privilege  management, audit, periodic reporting, 
and risk modeling.
INTRODUCTION
After  9/11, a  cry  arose within the United 
States that  the terrorist attack could have 
been  averted if government  agencies had 
shared what  they  knew  with  each  other. 
While  the accuracy  of that claim  remains in 
debate, there is significant evidence that 
agencies were sharing  less than  expected and 
that  they  would operate more effectively  if 
they  shared more information. Three years 
later, having  not  made significant progress 
towards that  goal,  the White House issued an 
Executive Order  mandating  the creation  of an 
Information  Sharing Environment; this goal 
was reinforced by  Congress later the same 
year when it was mandated in a new statute.1
In  the years since the goal was set,  an 
impediment to implementation  has been 
identified.  The sharing is mandated to be 
performed “[t]o the maximum  extent 
consistent  with  applicable law.”  However,  a 
gap exists between  the laws and policies 
enacted by  government  to regulate  the 
handling  of information  and the ability  to 
enforce those policies in computer  systems. 
There is a  strong  need to bridge that gap as 
more data  is or  is desired to be collected, 
shared,  and manipulated. Responsible 
managers and interested citizens alike are 
seeking  the means to ensure that  systems 
more effectively  implement rules about 
privacy,  security, and the appropriate 
conduct  of government  business. But, while 
people can express rules with  complex 
reasoning, context,  and reference to 
information  not  contained in  the subject 
data, information  systems historically  have 
not been  able to process policies written  this 
way.
For example, consider  the following 
snippet of legislation  enacted by  the state of 
Maryland:
A. Subject  to the provisions of  Regulation .12B, 
the Central  Repository  and other  criminal 
justice  agencies shall  disseminate  CHRI, be it 
conviction or  nonconviction  criminal  history 
record information, to a criminal  justice 
agency  upon a request  made in accordance 
with applicable  regulations adopted by  the 
Secretary. A  criminal  justice agency  may 
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request this information from the Central 
Repository  or another  criminal  justice agency 
only if it has a need for the information:
(1) In the  performance of  its function as a 
criminal justice agency; or
(2) For  the purpose of  hiring or retaining its 
own employees and agents.2 
It is clear  that the intent of this legislation  is 
to regulate the transmission  of sensitive 
criminal  history  record information so that  it 
is only  used for  appropriate purposes. 
However, the interactions between this 
specific  policy  and other  policies at  the 
organization, state,  and federal  level could 
potentially  be very  complex, and it  is not 
feasible for  humans to reason  over  all of them 
simultaneously.  In  addition,  the rules and 
terms used in  policies often  reference other 
policies and pieces of information  located in 
different databases or  organizations, which 
makes it  difficult  to efficiently  verify 
compliance by  hand.  Finally, given the 
number  of transactions that  happen  per  day, 
if a  violation  does occur, it  is difficult  to verify 
e x a c t l y  w h i c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  s h a r i n g 
transaction  was non-compliant  with  the 
applicable policies.
Given  that  computers are already 
ubiquitous in  data sharing environments due 
to the ease of sharing and aggregating 
information, it is worthwhile to investigate 
whether  or  not they  can also solve the 
problems listed above.  We built  a  prototype 
of an  “accountable system”  to address this 
challenge by  using  semantic web technology. 
Semantic web  technology  generally  seeks to 
express data  on  the internet in a  way  such 
that  machines can  reason  over  the semantics 
of the data  more readily. An  accountable 
system  is one that both knows which  policies 
apply  to which  data  (policy  awareness),  and 
one that can  reason over complex  policy  and 
the details of data  transactions. These two 
functions together  allow  organizations to 
fulfill their  obligations in  a  transparent and 
policy-aware manner. In this project,  we 
modeled transactions between Fusion 
Centers, locations where state and federal 
agencies work cooperatively  to address 
terrorism, crime, and emergency  response. 
Our  prototype shows that  the authoritative 
sources of information  needed to make 
policy-based decisions can  remain  and be 
accessed wherever  they  reside in the 
decentralized environment.
This paper  presents a  prototype system 
that  models the data sharing  workflow  in a 
Fusion  Center environment, with  the 
following features:
1. An  effective way  to represent  real 
legislation  and policies in  a  computer-
readable  language that  can  be reasoned 
upon.
2. A  model where existing  data can  remain 
in  disparate databases and servers which 
the reasoner  can  access on  the fly  during 
reasoning.
3. A  r e a s o n e r  w h i c h  c a n  a n a l y z e 
transactions with  rules and then present 
a  justification  of why  the transaction  is 
or is not compliant.
4. A  user  interface which analysts and law 
enforcement  can  use to determine 
whether transactions are compliant  with 
the applicable policies.  The user 
interface is designed for end users who 
have neither  a  legal  nor  a  technical 
background,  presenting  justifications in 
natural language to users.
The prototype demonstrates that  such  a 
reasoning system  can  be used to increase the 
amount  of transparency  and accountability  in 
real data-sharing  environments.  Given  any 
data  sharing  event,  the reasoner  can  produce 
a  transcript  that  shows exactly  which  pieces 
of data went into the decision, which  parts of 
the law  are relevant,  and the apparent 
compliance or  non-compliance with  those 
parts.
BACKGROUND
Semantic Web and Linked Data
The primary  motivation  of the semantic  web 
is that  by  associating  metadata with  data  on 
the web, it  enables computers to do more 
valuable computations than  if computers did 
not know  about  the semantics of the data at 
hand.  In  particular, websites today  are 
designed primarily  for  user consumption, in 
t h a t  m a c h i n e s h a v e a  h a r d t i m e 
understanding  the semantic  content  on any 
given  page. If the pages also provide 
machine-readable metadata, automated 
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agents can more easily  perform  tasks on 
behalf of the user.
Linked Data is the notion  that by 
associating a  unique identifier  (a  URI) with 
each  piece of data  in  question,  it  is possible to 
create unambiguous references between 
pieces of data. This ability  to create 
relationships between disparate datasets 
greatly  increases the utility  of the data, and 
allows computers to reason  over  the 
relationships between data. In  addition, it's 
no longer  necessary  to warehouse data  in  one 
centralized location,  as data  in  one database 
can  refer  to data in  another  database by  URI 
just as easily  as it can  refer  to data  in  the 
same database.  More details about Linked 
Data can be found in the work of Bizer, et al. 3
There has been  much existing  work  in 
developing the technologies that  enable the 
semantic  web.  The Resource Description 
Framework (RDF)  is a  model of data that 
provides a  way  to describe the relationship 
between  resources. 4  RDF allows for  the 
expression  of triples in the form  of a  subject, 
a  predicate,  and an  object. Once every 
resource we want to talk  about (actors, 
documents,  transactions,  policies,  etc.) has 
been  associated with  a  URI,  it is possible to 
use RDF to describe the relationship between 
these resources (e.g.  a  subject “transaction”,  a 
predicate “compliant  with”,  and an object 
“Federal  Privacy  Act”).  In  addition  to 
prov id ing  a way  to ta lk  about  the 
relationships between  data,  we also need a 
way  to describe the hierarchy  of objects and 
how  they  relate to each  other.  We do this 
through  the Web Ontology  Language (OWL).5 
OWL allows each  organization  to specify  the 
terms that they  are using  by  way  of an 
ontology, and each  organization  can  also 
specify  the ways entities are related to each 
other (e.g. a  police officer  is a  sworn  law 
enforcement).  In  addition, OWL lets us 
reason  between  the objects in  two different 
organizations without  implicitly  assuming 
that  organizations agree on  the terminology 
being used.  For  example, our  system  won't 
assume that  a  Maryland police officer  is 
interchangeable  with  a  Massachusetts police 
officer  unless that  relationship is made 
explicit.
These notions are particularly  important 
for  the applications we're exploring, in  that 
the fundamental  problem  we're  dealing  with 
is data  being sent  between organizations with 
different personnel and different  information 
systems. If users, data, and policies can all  be 
referred to in  the same language by  all 
organizations in  the system, it's not  necessary 
to also warehouse the data  in  the same place 
to reason  over  it. In  our  system, we are able 
to assign a URI to each  resource we wanted to 
talk about,  so it's possible for  each 
organization  in  our  simulation  to keep their 
data  on  separate servers. However,  systems 
located at  each  organization  are still able to 
dereference data  on  other organizations' 
systems, and reason  over  data  and personnel 
from  those organizations. This decentralized 
design  does not require a  central agency  to 
watch  over  all transactions to ensure 
compliance with  policy; it's possible for  each 
organization  to ensure that  the transactions 
they  engage in  are compliant with  the policies 
that  are relevant to them. In addition, since 
there is a  way  for  organizations to describe 
the way  they  store data  and the policies that 
are relevant  to them,  it's possible to describe 
the nuances of each  organization and their 
data in the data itself.
Goals of Accountable Systems
Accountable systems are an  alternate way  to 
consider  privacy  and security  in  computer 
systems. Almost  all existing  systems consider 
data  security  to be the problem  of 
safeguarding  private information  within 
certain  predefined boundaries.  However, 
private data  can often  be used in  certain 
contexts,  but use of that  data  in  other 
contexts can  often  be noncompliant with 
policy.  Thus, it  is worthwhile to design 
policies and technology  that  emphasize 
accountability  rather  than  impenetrability. 
Rather  than  limiting our  focus to preventing 
breaches of private data,  we should design 
systems that are aware of appropriate use 
and data  provenance, so that  once a  breach 
occurs,  it  is easier  to determine the source of 
the problem  and deal with  the data  release 
after the fact.
Specifically,  in  this case, we want  to use 
the ideas of accountable systems to give 
governments increased confidence that  they 
can  audit policy-compliant  data  sharing. For 
example,  if two parties share data  about a 
WATERMAN AND WANG, PROTOTYPING FUSION CENTER INFORMATION SHARING 3
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS,  SUPPLEMENT 3 (MARCH 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
person, then  a  manager, an  inspector,  or  a 
Court  should be able  to review  why  the 
system  concluded that  the data sharing  event 
was compliant  under  the policies governing 
the transaction.  Instead of relying  on  a  “black 
box”  giving  a  binary  assertion  about the 
validity  of the transaction,  it  should be 
possible to show  exactly  why  the transaction 
was considered valid under  the law. 
Similarly, if a  non-compliant transaction is 
identified,  it  should be possible to pinpoint 
exactly  what part  of the transaction is 
questionable,  and resolve the matter 
accordingly.6
WORKFLOW OVERVIEW
The implemented system  can  be queried with 
hypothetical situations, where a  user  asks if a 
document can  be sent between  two parties. It 
is assumed that both users have profiles 
detailing  their  various affiliations and other 
relevant  information.  Such  infrastructure 
already  exists in  almost every  organization,  in 
the form  of databases of personnel 
information. In addition,  the document  is 
assumed to be annotated with  information 
that  describes the content  of the document. 
The technology  to embed machine-readable 
metadata  into document  files is already 
prevalent  in  commercial  document editors. It 
is also assumed that  there is a  transcription 
of the law  into computer-readable policy. 
Such transcriptions can  be done by  a  policy 
author,  and only  needs to be done once per 
policy that needs to be reasoned over.
The user  gives URIs (Uniform  Resource 
Identifiers)  for  each  of these components to 
the system  through  a  web interface. The 
system  then  displays a  justification of 
whether or  not the hypothetical transaction  is 
valid.  For  our  prototype,  using  hypotheticals 
modeled on  real world scenarios, a user  can 
see exactly  which  pieces of the transaction  fit 
together  with which  clauses of the policy  to 




The rules governing  a  data  transaction  are 
whatever  policies are applicable to the 
particular  data,  actors,  actions,  and context. 
It is often  the case that many  different rules 
from  different  domains apply  simultaneously 
to a  given  transaction.  For example, if one 
shares data  between two different  states, data 
protection  laws from  both  states need to be 
applied to the transaction  – at a  minimum, 
the law  regulating  what a  sender may  release 
and the law  regulating  what a  receiver may 
view  or  store. These policies may  use 
different  vocabularies to describe the 
transaction  and may  use completely  different 
data sources to reach a sound justification.
Each  policy  has its own  notion  of how 
terms are defined and related. Thus,  each 
policy  has to also include an ontology  of 
terms, both  so that it  can reason  about  how 
terms relate to each  other (Is a  “police 
o f f i c e r ”  a  m e m b e r  o f “ s w o r n  l a w 
enforcement”?), and so that  two policies' 
meanings do not become conflated during 
reasoning.
Data
Historical approaches for  applying rules to 
data  focus on  categorizing the data in 
question. For  example,  in  the government 
arena, rules will  be applied broadly  across 
c a t e g o r i e s s u c h a s c r i m i n a l c a s e 
investigations or  sub-categories describing 
the type of investigation: e.g., drugs, 
kidnapping, tax  fraud.  However, the 
historical approach  falls short  of what is 
present  in  the law  today,  and a  different 
approach  is necessary. Consider  this one 
segment of a  sentence in  the Massachusetts 
law:
Information shall  be  provided or  made 
available... only  if  the individual  named in the 
request or  summary  has been convicted of  a 
crime punishable by  imprisonment  for  a term 
of  five  years or  more, or  has been convicted of 
any  crime and sentenced to any  term of 
imprisonment, and at  the time of the  request: 
is serving a  sentence  of probation or 
incarceration, or  is under  the  custody  of  the 
parole board... .7
T h i s e x a m p l e r e q u i r e s a s y s t e m 
implementing  the rule to know  not only  that 
the general class of data  being  acted upon 
falls into the broad class of criminal record, 
but it  also requires the ability  to represent 
information  from  within  the data  itself such 
as: the name of the criminal  subject, the 
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specific statute(s) under  which  convicted,  the 
length  of the sentence imposed, and the 
current status of the convict.
Entities Described in the Data
This rule requires the system  to be able to 
identify  at  least  three different  kinds of 
people – people who provide information, 
people who are the recipients of information, 
and people who are the subjects of the 
information. Many  systems can handle the 
first  two as system  users (discussed more 
below),  but have no mechanism  to easily 
communicate the details of a  person  within 
target  data. Our  system  uses semantic web 
techniques to represent these properties.  For 




which  tells the system  the URI that  identifies 
Robert B. Guy, the person in the data.
Rule in the Data
Establishing that the person  in  the data  “has 
been  convicted of a  crime punishable by 
imprisonment  for  a  term  of five years or 
more” is done by  including  a  tag  to indicate 





and by  including  a  second tag  for  the 
maximum  allowable sentence under  that 






Another  determinative fact  about  the data 
may  require the ability  to perform  date 
calculations.  Sharing  of information  is 
permitted if “at  the time of the request: is 
serving  a  sentence of probation or 
incarceration.”  We represented this as an 








With  these two pieces of information, the 
system  has the ability  to calculate  the end of 
the sentence based on the date it was 
imposed and compare that  to the “current” 
date – the date of the request for  a  data 
transaction.
Actors
Real  rules require the ability  to represent 
details about  users of the system  at a  fine 
granularity. Again,  semantic  web technology 
is well suited to this purpose because it  is 
possible to represent any  fact about  a  user  – 
from  the more traditional static  values of 
name, organization, and role,  to the 
discoverable or  computable ones such  as a 
person's security  keys or  the privileges that 
an  actor  has within  a  system.  Frequently, 
rules about  data  handling  are  dependent 
upon  what the individual is doing at  that 
moment.  For  example,  the Maryland law 
allows access to information  if and only  of it 
is used in the following two ways:8
1. In  the performance of its function  as a 
criminal justice agency; or
2. For  the purpose of hiring or  retaining its 
own employees and agents.
This sort  of information may  not be inferable 
from  within  a  system  and may  need to be 
collected as an assertion from the user.
Actions
In  order  to have meaning,  a  data  usage rule 
must  in  some way  reference what action  is 
being taken vis-à-vis the target data; it  must 
say  an  actor  can  or  cannot do something  with 
particular  data. These rules refer  to actions 
such  as “collect,”  “retain,”  “copy,”  “share,” 
and “delete.”  Often  the action is described 
using  common  words,  such  as “disseminate” 
or  “share,”  without any  definition – for 
example,  without specifying  whether  these 
terms apply  equally  to making  data  available 
through  push  or  pull.  Because we were 
m o d e l i n g  t h e i n f o r m a t i o n  s h a r i n g 
environment,  we focused on  sharing rules for 
the prototype,  but  could readily  represent 
other actions.
WATERMAN AND WANG, PROTOTYPING FUSION CENTER INFORMATION SHARING 5
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS,  SUPPLEMENT 3 (MARCH 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
MODELING THE 
COMPONENT PARTS IN RDF
Rules (AIR)
The rules in our prototype are represented in 
the AIR (Accountability  in  RDF) policy 
language,  as described by  Kagal, et  al. 9  AIR 
permits the expression of policies as a  series 
of patterns representing  criteria to be met for 
compliance with  a particular  rule; this works 
well  with legal rules which  often  are referred 
to as having  “elements”, such  as the five fair 
uses of copyright.  For  the prototype to be 
accessible for  evaluation  and validation by  a 
broad array  of interested parties (e.g., 
government executives, policy  leaders, 
lawyers,  and the professionals who need to 
share the information),  the sub-rules are 
coded in  the order  in  which  they  appear  in 
statute and annotated with  their  legal 
citations.  This is particularly  challenging 
because law  is generated through  negotiation 
and does not  generally  follow  formal logic 
structures. 
We know  that  some organizations will 
have the resources and interest  to create their 
own  representation of every  rule, but  that 
many  will opt for a  baseline available from  a 
rules library; even  in  the latter  case,  there will 
be law, legal  counsel  opinion, or  policy  that  is 
unique to an  organization.  For this reason, 
and to demonstrate  operat ion  in a 
decentralized environment, we modeled each 
organizat ion  having a  rules l ibrary 
somewhere within  the organization's 
network.
Figure 1: Overview of the Fusion Center System
Actors (FOAF)
The set  of attributes in  a user  profile is 
normally  quite limited in  organization 
databases.  We wanted to be able  to express 
essentially  anything  that might  come up in a 
rule and so chose to adapt FOAF (Friend of a 
Friend) profiles to represent  actors.10  The 
FOAF ontology  is a relatively  short  list  of 
attributes,  but  it  is possible to add an 
unlimited number of additional  attributes so 
long  as they  are given  a  URI and, preferably, 
associated with  a  definition in  a  supplemental 
ontology. 
Architecturally, we assumed that each 
organization  would continue to control the 
user profiles of its employees,  members, etc. 
We did not build,  but  assumed that  each 
organization  would ultimately  add,  a  security 
layer which determines how  much of a  profile 
to reveal  to a  requesting  system. For  example, 
if a  foreign  organization  asks for  specific user 
details in  order to reason over  them,  there 
should be a  system  that  determines which 
attributes are revealable and which  are 
private.
Data (PDF/XMP)
Data  can  be retained in  many  forms, 
including email,  text  documents, databases, 
and spreadsheets. Since there is already 
support  in  commercial  software, such  as 
Adobe Acrobat,  to annotate documents with 
RDF,  we were not  concerned with  modeling 
each  structured and unstructured form.  For 
our  prototype,  we modeled a  series of three 
memos – a  request for  information about a 
possible criminal  suspect  and responses – all 
in PDF with RDF in an embedded XMP file. 
REASONING OVER THE TRANSACTION
Reasoner
A  transaction  is evaluated against the policy 
by  a  forward chaining  reasoner, known as 
cwm. 11  Because of this design  choice, the 
reasoner  itself cannot issue calls for  more 
information. Pre-processing  must  deliver  all 
the necessary  data  to the reasoner.  For 
example,  the prototype automatically 
identifies to the reasoner  the URL for  the 
sender's profile,  the proposed recipient's 
profile,  and the target  data; it  also pre-
processes by  crawling those files for 
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references to other  policies or ontologies and 
delivers those URLs to the reasoner  as well. 
In  addition,  as alluded to earlier, the system 
searches rules for  any  assertions that  it will 
need, queries the user, and delivers the result 
to the reasoner.
TMS
The reasoner  has incorporated a  Truth 
Maintenance System, 12  a  dependency 
tracking mechanism.  This allows the system 
to retain  the dependencies upon  which  it 
relied to form  its conclusions. For  our 
prototype, this is extremely  useful because it 
allows users to see the basis for  a  decision, a 
function not available from  some other  policy 
reasoners. Also,  it  is an  efficient mechanism 
for  storing  the necessary  information  for 
aggregate reporting, risk  modeling,  or 
auditing at a later time.
Figure 2: Web Interface for Transactions
VISIBILITY TO USERS
Input: Transaction Simulator
People act  on  data  using many  systems and 
platforms. Rather  than  separately  model 
transactions in  email,  various portals, 
databases,  etc., we created a  user interface 
that  is intended to provide a  view  into the 
middleware, allowing  the user to identify  the 
minimal data  that  would be identified to the 
accountable system  regardless of application 
or  platform  – the sender, the target  data,  and 
the recipient. 
 the UI,  the sender  and receiver  are 
identified by  email address,  a  commonly 
known identifier, and presumed to be readily 
linked to the URL for  the user  profile  (FOAF 
file); the individual's picture and URL are 
automatically  populated on  the page. In 
addition,  choosing  the data  to be sent causes 
the UI to find and auto-populate the URL for 
the applicable policy. If necessary  to model a 
variant,  the user  can  override the policy 
linked to the data with a different policy. 
Input: Tabulator Views
Many  potential  users or  evaluators of the 
technology  will not  have the skill  to read 
program  code.  Using a  semantic web 
browser, Tabulator, 13 to view  our  input  code 
provides an  opportunity  for  those users to 
glimpse the meaning  of the native RDF. 
Tabulator  has multiple viewing panes 
including a  “FOAF View”  which  makes it 
possible to see the user  profiles in  a 
visualization  that looks more like a  list  of 
attributes, and a  “Table View” which  makes it 
possible to see an AIR policy's if-then-else 
structure in a nested chart. 
Output: Tabulator Views
The accountable system's results can  also be 
viewed in  special Tabulator  panes. The 
“Justification”  pane first  opens to a  single 
sentence that indicates if the proposed 
transaction  is compliant or  non-compliant 
with  the policy. Pressing the “Why?”  button 
provides the deep justification provided by 
the TMS, which shows each  belief and facts 
on  which the formation  of those beliefs 
depended.
The “Lawyer”  pane provides a shorter 
form  of the analysis by  generating  a  series of 
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near-grammatical sentences explaining  the 
requirement  of the rule,  the relevant  fact 
instances that  meet  or  fail  to meet that 
pattern,  and the citation for  the subsection  of 
the law  being  applied; the first  two are now 
represented as hyperlinks to the URLs to 
which they refer.
Figure 3: Lawyer View of Justification
RESULTS
Our  goal was to model  and execute six 
scenarios through  the reasoner; we 
accomplished that goal and built a  system 
with  sufficient  capability  and flexibility  that  it 
is possible to run  previously  undefined 
scenarios (mixing and matching  the 
component pieces in  unplanned ways) and 
also achieve correct results.
From  the research  perspective,  this 
exercise served primarily  to confirm 
expectations.  First,  it  demonstrated some 
notion of scalability. In  our  earlier  work,14 we 
fed to the reasoner  only  the input necessary 
to reach  a correct  conclusion. In this work, 
we fed the reasoner a significant  number  of 
rule patterns and facts that  were unnecessary 
to the conclusion  and confirmed,  so long  as 
the rules are expressed correctly, that  the 
correct result  will be produced – only  the 
appropriate sub-rules will  be found to 
support  relevant  beliefs,  and only  the 
r e l e v a n t f a c t s w i l l b e r e p o r t e d a s 
dependencies. As the “so long  as”  clause 
implies,  the work showed the importance and 
necessity  of validation,  i.e. the ability  to 
determine that  the rules have been  expressed 
correctly  in  their  entirety  – both  the pattern 
and its relationship to all  other  patterns (e.g., 
conditions,  exceptions,  order).  We also 
proved that  “broken”  or  undefined bits did 
not  necessarily  keep the system  from 
reaching a  conclusion.  For example,  if we run 
a  p a r t i c u l a r  s c e n a r i o u n d e r  t h e 
Massachusetts criminal records release law 
and the recipient has a  malformed tag  which 
was intended to identify  him  as a  member  of 
a  criminal justice agency  but fails to do so, 
the system  will  correctly  determine that  he is, 
by  a  later  sub-rule in  the policy,  entitled to 
receive such  information as any  member of 
the public may receive.
As part  of this research, we also 
demonstrated the prototype to a  variety  of 
relevant persons – ranging  from  Fusion 
Center  analysts to Intelligence Community 
management, both technical  and operational. 
The reactions were very  positive in that such 
an  accountable system  could ful f i l l 
government obligations to ensure  that 
information  sharing is handled in a  policy 
compliant manner  and to provide a  level of 
transparency to users.
The most significant resistance received 
was from  an  analyst  supervisor  who 
perceived this as having  the potential  to be a 
management  surveillance tool to question the 
ability  of individual analysts to know  and 
comply  with  all rules; however,  even  that 
individual  believed that the mechanism 
would be quite helpful  when  necessary  to 
apply  the rules of another  jurisdiction  (i.e., 
not one's own) and for  use as a  workflow 
management  tool.  Conversely, the analysts at 
a  demo the next day  were so enthusiastic  that 
they  wanted to know  if they  could build and 
u s e t h e F O A F - b a s e d u s e r  p r o f i l e s 
immediately. 
RELATED WORK
Most  of the work in  this field has focused on 
building  the individual  parts of a  system, 
rather  than  ensuring  that all of the pieces are 
capable of operating  together. Our group has 
published extensively  on  the importance of a 
model that  is aware that  accountability  is 
necessary. 15  There has been  work  in 
es tabl i sh ing  the importance o f the 
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isomorphism  between natural-language law 
and the machine-readable format, 16  which 
caused us to consider  very  carefully  whether 
or  not  AIR is expressive enough  for 
representing  real  laws. In  addition, there are 
other reasoning  languages similar  to AIR 
such  as XACML, 17   and EPAL, 18 which  can 
solve similar  problems but  without  the level 
of justification  granularity  presented in  this 
work.
There has also been  work  in  solving 
similar  problems, but  in  different domains. 
For  example,  there exists work  that 
documents the use of semantic web 
technologies for  policy  management in the 
social web. 19  In  addition,  there is similar 
work  being  done for  policy  enforcement in 
federated environments, 20  but  their  work 
does not seem  to have focused on the design 
of the reasoner.
FUTURE WORK
We learned that  the reasoner  is relatively  fast, 
for  example,  processing  the potentially  more 
than  100,000 possible  pattern  match 
combinations (twenty-seven  facts about  the 
sender,  twenty-five about  the recipient,  six 
about  the document,  and thirty-five rules)  in 
10-60  seconds, but  that  it  cannot produce the 
millisecond response necessary  to use the 
system  as a  real-time processor  for  programs 
that  handle millions of transactions daily, 
such  as border  applications for  customs and 
screening  passengers.  However,  the Fusion 
Centers we spoke to indicated that they  were 
producing  sufficiently  small numbers of 
analytical  reports per  day  that waiting  some 
seconds for  the evaluation would not be 
prohibitive.  We would like to test other 
reasoning strategies to reduced the time for 
throughput. 
W e a l s o a r e q u i t e i n t e r e s t e d i n 
coordinating with  other  test  components and 
systems. Because the United States 
Constitution establishes state sovereignty, the 
individual states do not  have to follow  a 
federal  mandate on  the standards for an 
accountable system  and,  as a  result,  we 
expect that for  accountability  to be viable 
there will always be more than  one platform, 
policy  language, and tagging  scheme in effect. 
Research  is needed to determine the 
feasibility  and strategies for  interchange 
among them.
And, we know  that  in  the physical world 
among  humans, complete  information  is not 
always available and yet  decisions must  be 
and are made. We would like to learn  more 
about  how  incomplete information  can  be 
effectively handled in an accountable system. 
CONCLUSION
Government information  shar ing  is 
mandated to be performed “[t]o the 
maximum  extent  consistent  with  applicable 
law.”  To date,  efforts to implement  that 
mandate have been  limited by  brittle systems 
that  require the system  designers to 
predetermine all  likely  permissions and then 
hardwire them. Here, we represented 
complex  policy,  reached an  array  of 
authoritative sources to implement  that 
complexity, successfully  reasoned over the 
policy,  and determined the correct  result of 
compliance/non-compliance. Via  this 
prototype, we have demonstrated the initial 
feasibility  of an  accountable  system, 
narrowing  the gap between  the expectations 
of law  and policy  and the ability  of technology 
to fulfill them.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
K. Krasnow  Waterman has  had dual careers  in 
technology management and the practice of law. She 
was  the CIO of the first post-9/11 task force  created  by 
the president, served as  the interim  chief operations 
executive for the  reorganization  of FBI  intelligence 
infrastructure, and represented the Department of 
Homeland Security in high-level negotiations  to set the 
requirements for interoperability of federal data 
systems. She now  divides  her time between managing 
large-scale operations infrastructure  and  researching 
new  web technology  at MIT's Computer Science lab. 
She may be contacted at kkw@MIT.EDU. 
Samuel Wang  is  a  second year PhD student at MIT, 
working as a member of the Decentralized 
Information  Group in the Computer Science  and 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. His  primary 
interests relate  to web technologies  and natural 
language  processing. Before  attending MIT, he 
completed his undergraduate  work  at Carnegie Mellon 
University  in Computer Science  and Mathematics. In 
addition, he worked  at Google as  a software  engineer, 
primarily on various aspects of web search.
WATERMAN AND WANG, PROTOTYPING FUSION CENTER INFORMATION SHARING 9
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS,  SUPPLEMENT 3 (MARCH 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
WATERMAN AND WANG, PROTOTYPING FUSION CENTER INFORMATION SHARING 10
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS,  SUPPLEMENT 3 (MARCH 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 White House, “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans,” Executive Order 13356 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2004) and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Public Law 
108-458, 108th Congress, 1st sess. (December 17, 2004).
2 Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR), Title 12, Section 15.01.11 (2009), http://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/
comarhtml/12/12.15.01.11.htm.
3 C. Bizer, T. Heath, and T. Berners-Lee, “Linked Data – The Story So Far,” International Journal on Semantic Web 
and Information Systems (2009).
4 O. Lassila and R. Swick,  “Resource Description Framework (RDF) Model and Syntax,”  W3C - World Wide Web 
Consotrium (1999),http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-rdf-syntax-19990222/. 
5 D. McGuinness, et al., “OWL Web Ontology Language Overview,” W3C Recommendation (February 10, 2004), 
http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features. 
6  A  more comprehensive treatment of  accountable systems can  be  found in the  paper  by  D. Weitzner  et al., 
“Information Accountability,” Communications of the ACM 51, no. 6 (2008): 82-87.
7 Massachusetts General Laws, “Administration of the Government,” Part 1, Title II, Chapter 6, Section 172 (2009), 
http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/Part1/TitleII/Chapter6/Section172.
8 COMAR, Title 12, 2009
9 L. Kagal, C. Hansen, and D. Weitzner, “Using Dependency Tracking to Provide Explanations for Policy 
Management,” Proceeding of the IEEE Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (Palisades, NY, 
June 2-4, 2008), http://doe.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109.POLICY.2008.51 .
10 D. Brickley and L. Miller, “FOAF Vocabulary Specification 0.91,” Namespace Document (FOAF Project: November  
2007), http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1. 
11 T. Berners-Lee, et al., “Cwm: A General Purpose Data Processor for the Semantic Web,”  Project Web Site, W3C 
(2006),http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/doc/cwm.html.
12 J. Doyle, “A Truth Maintenance System,” Artificial Intelligence 12, no. 3 (1979): 231-272.
13 T. Berners-Lee, et al., “Tabulator: Exploring and Analyzing Linked Dataon the Semantic Web,” Proceedings of the 
3rd International Semantic Web User Interaction Workshop (Athens, Georgia: November 6, 2006).
14 D. Weitzner, et al., “Transparent Accountable Data Mining: New Strategies for Privacy Protection,” in AAAI Spring 
Symposium on the Semantic Web Meets eGovernment Technical Report SS-06-06 (Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press, 
2006), http://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Spring/2006/SS-06-06/SS06-06-025.pdf. 
15 Ibid.
16 T. Bench-Capon and F. Coenen, “Isomorphism and Legal Knowledge Based Systems,” Artificial Intelligence and 
Law 1, no. 1 (1992): 65-86.
17 S. Godik, et al., “Extensible Access Control Markup Language (xacml) Version 1.0,” OASIS Standard (OASIS Open, 
2003), www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/944. 
18 P. Ashley, et al., “Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL 1.2),” Submission to W3C (2003), 
www.w3.org/Submission/2003/SUBM-EPAL-20031110/. 
19 J. Zeiss, et al., “A Semantic Policy Management Environment for End-Users,” Proceedings of International 
Conference on Semantic Systems (2008), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.139.3129.  
20 V. Hu, S. Quirolgico, and K. Scarfone, “Access Control Policy Composition for Resource Fedeartion Networks Using 
Semantic Web and Resource Description Framework (RDF),” Proceedings of the 2008 International Computer 
Symposium (Taiwan,  November 13-15, 2008). 
Copyright © 2011 by  the author(s).  Homeland Security  Affairs is an academic 
journal  available free of charge to individuals  and institutions. Because the purpose 
of this publication  is the widest possible dissemination  of knowledge, copies of this 
journal  and the articles contained herein  may be printed or  downloaded and 
redistributed for  personal, research  or educational purposes free of  charge and 
without permission. Any  commercial  use of Homeland Security Affairs or the articles 
published herein  is expressly  prohibited without the written consent  of the copyright 
holder. The copyright of all  articles  published in  Homeland Security Affairs rests 
with  the author(s) of  the article. Homeland Security  Affairs is the online journal  of 
the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
http://www.hsaj.org
WATERMAN AND WANG, PROTOTYPING FUSION CENTER INFORMATION SHARING 11
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS,  SUPPLEMENT 3 (MARCH 2011) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
